The well-timed volume is the result of a collaboration by three New York Times writers: correspondent Judith Miller, who is known for her reports from the Middle East and the former Soviet Union; Stephen Engelberg, the Times' investigations editor; and William Broad, Pulitzer Prize-winning science writer. They have produced, as expected, a professional job of reporting. Their investigations concentrated on policy debates over the past two decades among U.S. government and military officials regarding defense against biological warfare.

The sources for the book's detailed accounts of inside-the-beltway struggles over germ-warfare strategy include scores of key players. One of those whose name appears often is Bill Patrick, who became a "a main problem solver" for the U.S. biowarfare community during his long, influential tenure as a government employee. So too do the Nobel Prize laureate, geneticist, and microbiologist Joshua Lederberg, who has consulted with and advised decision makers for years; Ken Alibek, the defector who shocked the West when he went public with his account of the former Soviet Union's massive effort to develop a biological warfare arsenal; Mathew Meselson, the Harvard biologist and veteran biological warfare watchdog and critic; former President Bill Clinton; and more. The authors list well over a hundred interview subjects.

The book opens with a particularly interesting summary of an early, relatively unpublicized instance of biological terrorism on U.S. soil. This involved the deliberate contamination of restaurants with Salmonella bacteria by the Rajneesh cult in Oregon in 1984. At the time, police, government, and public-health authorities downplayed the attack. This doesn't change the fact that this incident, the "first large-scale use of germs by terrorists on American soil," may have included deliberate contamination of ten restaurants and a supermarket. Between 700 and 800 diners suffered food poisoning as a result. "Quietly," the Times' reporters conclude their first chapter, "the small cadre of experts and federal officials who understood the power of germ weapons began to wonder if the attack in Oregon was an anomaly or a harbinger."

Now they know.

One man who always appreciated the threat was Bill Patrick. The modern history of U.S. efforts to develop and defend itself against germ warfare is largely reflected by his career as a government scientist who worked at Fort Detrick, Maryland, a key center for biological weapons research in North America. Patrick began his unusual career in 1951, when he was a 25-year-old microbiologist. In the early 1970s, as the United States shifted its efforts from offensive to defensive biological warfare, Patrick made the transition. Now retired from government service, Patrick consults. It does not appear as if he will ever lack clients.

By interweaving the reminiscences, comments, and opinions of the main players with the historical record, the authors manage a fairly smooth commentary about the major recent developments and incidents that define their topic. While the book's emphasis on decision making may make dry reading for those more interested in the biology of germ warfare, it nevertheless provides good coverage of the bioweapons industry that the Soviets constructed before their empire crashed. And if anyone hasn't fully appreciated the headaches Saddam Hussein's germ-warfare efforts caused U.S. military planners in the months leading up to the Gulf war, they will understand after finishing this book. Also, another cult besides the Rajneeshees receives some description in the text: the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. Best known for releasing nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, this bizarre doomsday group strove - thankfully without success - to master germ weapons as well.

As might be expected from the efforts of three respected reporters who daily provide "history's first draft" in the pages of their newspaper, this book reads like a respectable second draft of history. The authors have included 42 pages of notes citing references and sources, something unfortunately lacking in many books written for lay audiences. There is also a useful, four-page bibliography of selected titles that includes some of the best books on all the topics and events covered in Germs.

Perhaps the feature that most recommends this book is the accumulation of revelations, opinions, and insights that lead the authors to their summation after three years of work: "If we as a nation believe that the germ threat is a hoax, we are spending too much money on it. But if the danger is real, as we conclude it is, then the investment is much too haphazard and diffuse. We remain woefully unprepared for a calamity that would be unlike any this country has ever experienced."

One hopes the authors are already researching and outlining the next, updated edition of Germs. Events since September 11 make it more important than ever that the press closely examine the government's response and preparations for what has the potential to become the mother of all terror attacks. There is no longer a question about past terrorist attacks with germ weapons; they were not anomalies. They were harbingers, as events that occurred after the publication of this book proved.